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Half a generation ago the Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright1
found the Sixth Amendment right to counsel "fundamental and essen-
tial to a fair trial."2 Mr. Justice Black, speaking for an unanimous
Court, referred to lawyers as "necessities, not luxuries."3 He said the
"noble ideal" of fair trials "cannot be realized if the poor man charged
with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him," and
declared that "any person hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him."4 One might therefore have expected per curiam reversals, follow-
ing Gideon, of criminal convictions where assistance of counsel was
denied. Instead, several courts upheld such convictions for'misdemean-
ors, and the Court repeatedly denied certiorari. 5
The rights of the misdemeanant remained confused. Frequently,
state courts read Gideon as not requiring counsel in misdemeanor cases
only to have the local federal court void the convictions on a different
reading of Gideon. 6 Nonetheless, most states in the decade after Gideon
* B.S., 1956, Arizona State University; J.D., 1959 University of Arizona; LL.M.,
1961, Yale Law School; Law Clerk to Mr. Justice Douglas, 1959 Term; Professor of
Law, Yale Law School.
1372 U.S. 335 (1963).
21d. at 343.
:\ Id. at 344.
41d.
~ E.g., Heller v. Connecticut, 389 U.S. 902 (1967); Dejoseph v. Connecticut, 385
U.S. 982 (1966); Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966). The court further limited its
Gideon decision in Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), when it referred to Gideon
as holding that there "was an absolute right to appointment of counsel in felony cases."
(emphasis added) Id. at 134. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,36 (1967). Gideon was
in fact convicted of a felony and sentenced to five years in prison. There was nothing
in the Court's rationale, however, which relied on the significance of a "felony" charge.
"Brinson v. Florida, 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967); Arbo v. Hegstrom, 261
F. Supp. 397 (D. Conn. 1966).
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did extend the right to counsel to some misdemeanants. 7 A few even
went all the way, extending the right to every indigent accused of any
offense, petty or serious. 8
II. ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN
Finally, in June, 1972 the Court returned to the problem. In Arger-
singer v. Hamlin,9 19 year old Jon Argersinger had pled guilty10 in a
Florida court to carrying a concealed weapon, an offense punishable by
up to six months in jail and a $1000 fine, without being informed of
his right to counsel. He was sentenced to a $500 fine or 90 days in
jail.ll Alleging that he had been indigent and unable to afford counsel,
he sought habeas corpus. The Florida Supreme Court reluctantly
brought state law into line with that of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida,12 and extended the right of ap-
pointed counsel to offenses "punishable by more than six months im-
prisonment."13 Since Argersinger's offense was just under the line, how-
ever, the writ was dismissed by the Florida Court.
Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion for the Supreme Court. As
in Gideon, the State of Florida was held to have denied the petitioner
his Constitutional right to counsel.
Mr. Justice Douglas noted that the Sixth Amendment contains stan-
dards for "all criminal prosecutions." Among the rights guaranteed by
that amendment are the right to a speedy and public trial, the right to
know the charge, the right of confrontation, and the right to compulsory
process.14 Yet the only right guaranteed by the Sixth· Amendment
which has been limited by type of offense is the right to trial by jury.
7 See Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright ill the Fifty
States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103 (1970).
8 Blake v. Municipal Court, 242 Cal. App. 2d 731, 51 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1966). "Ap-
parently, in nine states virtually all misdemeanants have the right to appointed coun-
sel ...." Comment, supra note 7, at 124.
9 407 U.S. 25 (1971).
10 Brief for Appellant, Argersinger supra note 9, Appendix at 5.
11 /d. at 7. Nowhere in the Supreme Court's opinion was it noted that Argersinger
had pleaded guilty, nor that his sentence had been a fine or imprisonment. Instead,
the Court said in its statement of facts, "The trial was to a judge, and petitioner was
... sentenced to serve 90 days in jail ...." 407 U.S. at 26.
12 Brinson v. Florida, 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
13 State ex rei. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 1970).
14 The sixth amendment provides,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the Witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
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Duncan v. Louisiana15 restricted such right to offenses punishable by
six months or more. 16 Justice Douglas then disposed of Duncan with
the observation that the right to jury trial "has a different genealogy
and is brigaded with a system of trial to a judge alone. "17 "While there
is historical support for limiting ... trial by jury to 'serious criminal
cases', there is no such support for a similar limitation on the right to
assistance of counsel. "18 The Court therefore rejected "the premise that
since prosecutions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than
six months may be tried without a jury, they may also be tried without
a lawyer."19
The Court then quoted Powell v. Alabama20 and Gideon21 on the
essential role of a lawyer in the adversary process, and noted that the
rationale of those cases "has relevance to any criminal trial, where an
accused is deprived of his liberty" (emphasis supplied).22 Petty offense
trials may be as complex as those for felonies,23 and "the volume of
misdemeanor cases ... may create an obsession for speedy dispositions,
regardless of the fairness of the result."24 Citing a study, the Court said
"[m]isdemeanants represented by attorneys are five times as likely to
emerge from police court with all charges dismissed as are defendants
who face similar charges without counsel."25
Putting aside the right to counsel where "loss of liberty is not in-
volved,"26 the Court held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver,
no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty,
misdemeanor or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his
trial."27
15 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
16 Actually, DUllcan merely held that a defendant charged with an offense punishable
by statute with a sentence up to two years and who actually was sentenced to 60 days
was entitled to a jury trial. The Court said, however, that crimes "carrying possible
penalties up to six months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty
offenses." Id. at 159.
17 407 U.S. at 29.
181d. at 30.
191d. at 30-31.
20 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
21 372 U.S. at 344.
22407 U.S. at 32.
231d. at 33.
241d. at 34.
251d. at 36. See A.C.L.U., Legal Counsel for Misdemeanants, Preliminary Report 1
(1970). For similar findings, see L. HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MISDEMEANOR
COURT 18-20 (1973) (hereinafter cited as HERMAN).
261d. at 37.
271d.
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In a lengthy concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Powell argued that the
requirement of counsel for all defendants imprisoned was too rigid. He
correctly noted that petty offenses not involving imprisonment are often
complex,28 carry stigma, and have severe collateral consequences, such
as loss of driver's licenses.29 On the other hand, he claimed, it is possible
for a layman to obtain a fair trial without counsel, even if the result is
imprisonment.3o Surely, he argued, counsel should not automatically be
appointed in cases where counsel would seldom be employed by non-
indigents. 31
Instead of the Court's "inflexible rule," Mr. Justice Powell urged a
determination of the right on "a case-by-case basis,"32 taking into ac-
count "the complexity of the offense charged," whether the state is
represented by counsel, the "probable sentence" upon conviction, and
other "individual factors," such as the competence of the defendant and
the attitudes of the community toward the defendant or the offense.33
In making clear that no person can be imprisoned for a criminal
offense without counsel, the Court clarified little else. Probably more
than 95 percent of persons charged with misdemeanors are not sent to
jaiP4 What are their rights, after Argersinger? Before Argersinger, a
substantial number of courts, state and federal,. had held that counsel
was required for an offense where the statutorily prescribed maximum
penalty exceeded six months in jail.35 Some had also held that an offense-
by-offense evaluation should be made of petty offenses and counsel
appointed whenever, by reason of the authorized jail sentence, the
probable jail sentence, the authorized or probable fines, or other col-
2Hld. at 47 (Powell, 1., concurring).
2!l /d. at 48.
:lO Id. at 50.
:J] Id. at 49-50.
32/d. at 63.
33/d. at 65. Mr. Justice Powell did not attempt to apply his proposed test to the
virtually non-existent Argersinger record. His concurrence was presumably based upon
the failure of the appointing 'judge to exercise any discretion in the matter.
34 In New Jersey during 1961-62, of 122,000 misdemeanor complaints, 18,000
(15%) resulted in direct jail sentences and another 6000 defendants (5%) went to
jail in lieu of fine payments. L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL
CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 123 (1965) (hereinafter cited as SILVERSTEIN).
But in New York, in 1969, almost two million people were convicted of traffic offenses.
Only 40 were imprisoned or given sllspended sentences. Criminal Court of the City
of New York Annual Report of 1969 at 13, Table 3, line II. See further data in
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 38 n.IO.
35 See, e.g., Brinson v. Florida, 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967); State v. Morris,
275 N.C. 50, 165 S.E.2d 245 (1969); Plutshack v. State Dep't of Health & Social
Serv., 37 Wis. 2d 713, 155 N.W.2d 549 (1968).
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lateral consequences, the charge was serious.36 Argersinger has been
read by many as replacing or nullifying these standards.37 Such interpre-
tations are erroneous.
The Florida Supreme Court in Argersinger had read Duncan v.
Louisiana,38 although dealing with the right to trial by jury, as req.uir-
ing counsel in cases where the maximum authorized penalty exceeded
six months in jail. Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in Argersinger, in dis-
tinguishing the right to jury trial from other Sixth Amendment rights,
said nothing which could fairly be construed as a retreat from the no-
tion that any offense punishable by law with more than six months is a
"criminal offense" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, regard-
less of the sanction actually imposed, and requires both a jury trial and
counsel. Mr. Justice Powell, in concurrence, addressed himself to this
issue, moreover, and said that, at a minimum, when the Constitution
guarantees a jury trial-as it does for offenses punishable in law by
more than six months-it a fortiori guarantees the right to appointed
counsel.39 That a layman might adequately defend himself in a trial
before a judge may be debatable, but it is ludicrous to conceive of a
fair jury trial without a defense lawyer.4o
There is language in Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion however, which, if
lifted from its context, can be read as reopening the question of the
right to counsel in offenses punishable in law by more than six months.
In the last paragraph of his opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas enigmatically
states:
The run of misdemeanors will not be affected by today's rul-
ing. But in those that end up in the actual deprivation of a
person's liberty, the accused will receive the benefit of "the
guiding hand of counsel" so necessary when one's liberty is
in jeopardy.41
36James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969); Burrage v. Superior Court, 105
Ariz. 53,459 P.2d 313 (1969).
37 See, e.g., Sweeton v. Sneddon, 463 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1972); Mahler v. Birn-
baum, 95 Idaho 14, 501 P.2d 282 (1972); HERMAN, supra note 25, at 74; Comment,
The Effect of Argersinger v. Hamlin on the Municipal Court of Toledo, Ohio, 4 U.
TOLEDO L. REV. 577 (1973) ("The right to appointed counsel is not applicable to
offenses resulting in a fine."); Note, 22 J. PUB. L. 191, 194 (1973) (Argersinger
"replaced" felony-manslaughter distinction with an imprisonment standard).
38 391 U.S. 145 (1968). .
39 "It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel line is to be drawn, it must be
drawn so that an indigent has a right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there
is a due process right to a jury trial." 407 U.S. at 45-46.
40 See 407 U.S. at 46. See also State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 398, 154 N.W.2d 888,
894 (1967).
41 407 U.S. at 40.
HeinOnline -- 12 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 606 1974-1975
606 THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:601
If read without the background of the jury trial cases, this paragraph
could be thought an invitation to deny counsel in "the run of" cases
merely by foregoing imprisonment.42
Such an interpretation would draw support from the confusing con-
currence of the Chief Justice. In attempting to supply some guidance to
judges and prosecutors "sitting in petty and misdemeanor cases,"43 he
opined that in "jury cases," the prosecutor should help the judge decide
in advance of trial, if imprisonment is "a significant likelihood."44 Since
the Court in Argersinger, as well as in other cases, uses the term "petty
offense" to include all offences punishable by six months or less,45 it is
hard to understand how the question of imprisonment-in-fact should
arise in determining the right to counsel in a non-petty misdemeanor
case-unless the six month penalty line was eroded by Argersinger.
Similarly, since the Constitution rarely requires a jury trial for offenses
not punishable in law by more than six months46-and most states
grant no more than the Constitution requires47-the same question
arises with respect to the Chief Justice's reference to "jury cases." How
can the trial judge legitimately be doubtful about the right to counsel in
a case to be tried by jury-unless the six month rule no longer obtains?
It is clear, however, that the Constitution requires a jury trial and
counsel for a defendant charged with an offense punishable in law by
more than six months in prison. In Baldwin v. New York,48 the Court
said, "no offense can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of the right to trial
by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized."49
Is a penalty of more than six months "authorized" if the relevant statute
permits it but the trial judge determines in advance of trial that it will
not be imposed? Duncan makes clear that the answer is yes:
42 See Miller and Lefcoe, Gideon's Encore: The Argersinger Decision in Virginia, 30
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 431, 434 (1973). It has unfortunately been so misconstrued by
other authorities. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
43 407 U.S. at 42 (Burger, C.L, concurring).
44/d.
45 18 U.S.C. § I (1970) subdivides misdemeanors, providing that those for which
the penalty "does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not
more than $500, or both, is a petty offense." This is the meaning given to "petty
offense" by Mr. Justice Douglas in Argersinger (407 U.S. at 36) and substantially
that employed by the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968) and
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970).
46 There are exceptions, where offenses not punishable by more than six months have
been held "serious" and requiring jury trials, e.g., District of Columbia v. Colts, 282
U.S. 63 (1930), but these are rare.
47 See Brief for Appellant, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Appendix A).
48 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
49/d. at 69.
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. the penalty authorized for a particular crime is of major
relevance in determining whether it is serious or not and may
in itself, if severe enough, subject the trial to the mandates of
the Sixth Amendment. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300
U.S. 617 (1937). The penalty authorized by the law of the
locality may be taken 'as a gauge of its social and ethical
judgments,' 300 U.S. at 628 of the crime in question. In
Clawans the defendant was jailed for sixty days, but it was
the 90-day authorized punishment on which the Court focused
in determining that the offense was not one for which the
Constitution assured trial by jury.50
The Court in Duncan also expressly rejected the argument that "the
critical factor is not the length of the sentence authorized but the length
of the penalty actually imposed. "51 Instead, the Court said, when "a
legislative judgment as to the seriousness of the crime is embedded in
the statute in the form of an express authorization to impose a heavy
penalty," it is this judgment, rather than that of the sentencing judge,
which determines the applicability of the Sixth Amendment.52
Thus, Argersinger, Baldwin, and Duncan together establish that
where a defendant is charged with an offense punishable by statute with
more than six months, or where he is entitled to a jury trial, or he is to
be imprisoned in fact for any length of time, however short, he has a
Constitutional right to appointed counsel. Those who have read Arger-
singer as approving denial of appointed counsel merely because a jail
sentence is not imposed are plainly wrong~3Argersinger expressly did not
decide the right to counsel where "loss of liberty is not involved."54 It
should not be construed as if it held the right inapplicable in such a
case.
The Sixth Amendment states that in "all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy" a panoply of specified rights. Most of them, as Mr.
Justice Douglas noted in Argersinger, have never been limited.55 Only
50 391 U.S. 159-60. See also, Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970): "In
deciding whether an offense is 'petty', we have sought objective criteria reflecting the
seriousness with which society regards the offense ... and we have found the most
relevant such criteria in the severity of the maximum authorized penalty."
51 391 U.S. at 162 n.35.
521d. This was reaffirmed in dictum in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 414 U.S. 1063
(1974).
53 Accord, Wood v. Supt. Caroline Corr. Unit, 355 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Va. 1973);
Mills v. Municipal Court for San Diego Jud. Dist., 10 Cal.3d 288, 515 P.2d 288, 110
Cal. Rptr. 329 (1973).
54 407 U.S. at 37.
55 The Court quotes approvingly (407 U.S. at 28) the observation of Professor
Junker, that "It is simply not arguable, nor has any court ever held, that the trial of
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one, the right to jury trial, has been confined to "serious", i.e. non-petty
offenses. Prior to Argersinger, the Court had never decided whether the
right to counsel, like the right to trial by jury, should be confined to
non-petty offenses or whether the literal meaning of the Sixth Amend-
ment should apply to the right to counsel along with the other Sixth
Amendment rights. A possibility not mentioned by the Court is that the
right to counsel is in a third category, applicable in some "petty" offense
cases but, unlike the right to confrontation, or the right to a public
trial, not applicable in all. The failure to acknowledge this possibility
accounts for much of the confusion in the opinion, but also, gives a
clear clue to the future direction of the right to counsel.
It is, of course, anomalous to hold that some rights guaranteed in
"all criminal prosecutions" are only guaranteed in some, whereas other
rights in the same sentence of the Sixth Amendment are unqualified.
This requires that two meanings be given to the very same words. The
anomaly would be compounded if the Court were explicitly to locate the
right to counsel on a continuum between the other Sixth Amendment
rights. Moreover, the pull of purse, personnel, and politics, as well as
the claims of history,56 compelled the Court to acknowledge the double
meaning of "criminal prosecutions" where the right to jury trial is con-
cerned. The right to jury trial is too expensive and burdensome on the
courts and the public to warrant its recognition in petty cases where the
stakes are small. And there is nothing inherently unfair about a bench
trial (at least if the accused has counsel). As the Court recognized in
Argersinger, this is not true of the right to counsel. Jury trials are more
expensive than appointed counsel, and involve greater tolls on the time
of the court, prosecutors, witnesses, and the public. The right of ap-
pointed counsel also applies only to indigents, who make up a small
fraction of defendants in misdemeanor cases,5i whereas trial by jury is
not conditioned on indigency. In sum, the right of appointed counsel is
less burdensome to the state and more important to a fair trial than
trial by jury. Still, the burden would be considerable were the Court
explicitly to hold the right applicable in all criminal cases and, given
a petty offense may be held in secret, or without notice ... [or the] right to confront
his accusers or to compel ... witnesses in his own behalf." Junker, The Right to
Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV. 685, 705 (1968).
56 See, Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of
Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1926); cf. Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!
26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245 (1959).
5i It has been estimated that the number of alleged misdemeanants unable to afford
an adequate defense is "probably not more than 25 %." Silverstein, supra note 34, at
125. This estimate apparently excluded traffic offenses. If these are included in the
calculation, the percentage would probably be far lower since traffic offenses are surely
committed, for the most part, by the relatively affluent.
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the resistance of legislators and courts to recognition of the right in the
past, such an abrupt decision could wreak temporary chaos. Hence, the
Court eschewed adoption of the third possibility, from which retreat
would have been difficult, and deliberately obscured its rationale. The
obscurity gives the States a chance to gear up for the next advance and
leaves the Court free in the future to hold the right of counsel appli-
cable "in all criminal prosecutions."
After Argersinger, there should be a two-dimensional determination
of right to counsel. The first, which has been largely ignored of late but
was in no way discarded by Argersinger, focuses on the offense itself.
The other, a secondary backstop, centers on the sanction actually im-
posed. The former is far more important for the future than the latter.
Indeed, the latter "imprisonment-in-fact" test is merely an interim
benchmark the importance of which should disappear as more liberal
determinations of the right to counsel are developed under the first test.
III. THE Two-DIMENSIONAL DETERMINATION
OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. A Significant Offense Test
Any offense which is not "petty" for purposes of determining right
to trial by jury is an offense for which the indigent accused is entitled
to appointed counsel. There are no precise boundaries between "petty"
and "serious" offenses. 5s Not only is any offense for which the legislature
has authorized a jail sentence of more than six months a "serious" one,59
an offense for which a large fine is the only sanction may also be non-
petty.60 Furthermore, the Court has held, even a traffic offense, reckless
driving, for which thirty days in jail and a $100 fine were authorized,
may be "an act of such obvious depravity that to characterize it as a
petty offense would be to shock the general moral sense. "61
The Court clearly held in Argersinger, however, that the line between
"petty" and "serious" for jury trial purposes is not determinative of
right to counsel. This right attaches far lower on a scale of seriousness.
In referring to the loss of liberty as "serious," the Court used the word
in its ordinary sense, not as a technical concept. 62 The Court's meaning
oSSee Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-62 (1968). The distinction is the
same as that between malum prohibitum and malum ill se. District of Columbia v.
Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930).
59 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970).
flO United States v. R. L. Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377, 380 (6th Cir. 1971) (fine of
$500 makes offense "serious"); ct. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196
(1971 ).
61 District of Columbia v. Colts, supra note 58, at 73.
62 407 U.S. at 28, 37.
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would better have be~n communicated by a different adjective, such as
"significant." In holding that, absent all else, a loss of liberty for how-
ever short a period is a sufficient deprivation to require counsel, the
Court provided a new criterion, albeit a vague one, for determining
significance. If the probable consequences of a conviction are depriva-
tions equivalent to a loss of liberty, then the stakes are high enough to
require counsel. That, it seems, is the major implicit and eminently
sound premise of Argersinger. Departures from this premise will mark
the occasions for future Court decisions on the matter.
An abstract evaluation of offense categories for purposes of deter-
mining right to counsel is greatly superior to the "case-by-case" ap-
proach suggested by Mr. Justice Powell. 63 The circumstances-of-the-case·
test was a failure under Betts v. Brady,64 and is even more certain to be
such in misdemeanor cases.
The four or five million or more misdemeanor cases in this country
every year65 are usually disposed of on an assembly-line basis,66 often
by judges who aren't even lawyers,67 frequently without a transcript. 68
To expect a magistrate or minor court judge effectively and conscien-
tiously to consider all the relevant circumstances in advance of pleading
63 See ABA PROJECT FOR STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 4.1, Commentary at 40 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
DEFENSE SERVICES] ("... the standard does not recommend a determination of the
need for counsel in terms of the facts of each particular case; it draws a categorical
line at ... types of offenses...."). This standard was quoted approvingly in Mr.
Justice Douglas' Argersinger opinion. 407 U.S. at 39.
64 316 U.S. 455 (1942). See generally, Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1962); Allen, The Supreme Court,
Federalism. and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 DEPAUL L. REV. 213, 226 (1959).
65 It is estimated that "there are between 4 and 5 million adult misdemeanor cases
each year, exclusive of traffic cases." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 55 (1967) [here-
inafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. Estimates of traffic offenses have been as high
as 50 million per year. Katz, Gideon's Trumpet: Mournful and Muff/ed, 55 IOWA L.
REV. 523 (1970).
66 HERMAN, supra note 25, at 15.
67 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 65, at 32.
68 "There is usually no court reporter unless the defendant can afford to pay one."
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 65, at 30. In Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189
(1971), the Court unanimously held that an indigent convicted of nonfelony violations
of municipal ordinances and fined $250 on each of two counts was entitled under the
Equal Protection Clause to a free trial transcript or a record of "sufficient complete-
ness" to permit proper consideration of his claims and to assure "as effective an appeal
as would be available to the defendant with resources to pay his own way." Chicago's
distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, providing free transcripts only for
appeals of felonies, was declared an "unreasonable distinction." ld. at 196. The City
also argued that defendant was not entitled to a transcript since he had not been
sentenced to jail. The Court responded, "The invidiousness of the discrimination that
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is to expect the impossible. To require him to place these circumstances
on the record, together with his "reasons" for denying counsel, "so that
the issue could be preserved for review,"69 is to require him to spend
more time and money than would likely be expended by appointment
of counsel.
It is futile to expect a trial judge at the early stages of the case,
before counsel has been appointed, to evaluate "the complexity of the
offense charged."70 Legal complexity depends on the skill and imagina-
tion of a defense lawyer. There is no way in which a judge can reliably
determine--even in a traffic case-that the offense is legally simple or
uncomplicated. 71 Similarly, factual complexity cannot be known before
the judge has heard the case. This, too, will often be a product of the
knowledge, skill and preparation of the defense lawyer, and is closely
intertwined with the legal defense. A determination that counsel is not
needed because a case is "simple" is nothing more than a self-sustaining
prophesy. Questions of complexity ought to be permanently excised
from determinations of the right to trial counsel.
Another factor, taken into account under the Betts regime, and urged
for misdemeanor cases by Mr. Justice Powell, is "the competency of the
individual defendant to present his own case."72 How the judge can be
expected to make this determination before the trial is a mystery. More-
over, "competence" of the accused is related to the complexity of the
case. There is a sense in which one may be "competent" to offer no
defense, or an impenetrable alibi, but this surely signals no competence
to offer something in between. Competence, like complexity, is beyond
the capacity of a trial judge to determine even after a lawyerless trial.
Finally, we are dealing with people who cannot afford the often modest
price of a lawyer. A person so disadvantaged, in our affluent society, as
to be indigent is virtually always poorly educated. It borders on the
fatuous to speak of an indigent as competent "to present his own case."
If he had the skill and learning to present a defense in court, qualities
exists when criminal procedures are made available only to those who can pay is not
erased by any difference in the sentences that may be imposed . . . . The practical
effects of conviction of even petty offenses of the kind involved here are· not to be
minimized. A fine may bear as heavily on an indigent accused as forced confinement."
ld. at 197. Is it conceivable that an indigent defendant could have a constitutional
right to a transcript on appeal from a petty offense conviction not involving loss of
liberty but have no right to a court reporter at trial or arraignment? Is it conceivable
that such an accused could be entitled to a free trial transcript but not a free lawyer?
69 407 U.S. at 63.
70 Jd. at 64.
71 See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966).
72 407 U.S. at 64.
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possessed by a distinct minority of the legal profession,73 he would
almost certainly not be indigent. It is time to forget about "competency"
as a factor determining the right to counsel.
Requiring the trial judge to predict the probable sentence upon con-
viction is also troublesome. There are doubtless many classes of misde-
meanors for which jail is virtually never imposed, even for a confirmed,
resolute criminal. It is easy enough to isolate such offenses by cate-
gory,74 but this is a determination of offenses rather than "case-by-case."
Where likelihood of a substantial penalty depends on the facts of the
offense, the defendant's record, and other individual criteria, it under-
mines the prospect of a fair trial to arm the trial judge with adverse
information in advance of trial,'5 and it places a time-consuming, if not
impossible, burden on both the prosecutor and the judge.76 Moreover,
if a judge determines that jail is a likelihood upon conviction and there-
fore appoints counsel, a subsequent jail sentence will appear to have
been the product of a pre-trial determination, and not the result of what
the evidence, tested at trial, disclosed. This would cast doubt on the
impartiality of the judge. And if a judge other than the one who ap-
pointed counsel accepts a plea or tries the case, the appointment of
counsel by the first judge will be a signal that a jail sentence is appro-
priate, undermining the objectivity of the second judge.
The tests employed under Betts and proposed for petty offenses by
Mr. Justice Powell are either irrelevant or impossible to administer.
Determining whether an offense is significant has the virtue of relevance.
It is the consequences of a conviction which determine whether denial
of counsel to an indigent is consistent with a fair trial. Moreover, deter-
mination by offense is a one-time operation and need not be repeated
with each new case. If it had no other superiority this would be enough
to compel it over a case-by-case approach.
B. Some Significance Factors
In determining whether an offense is significant, a court should surely
consider the maximum penalty authorized by statute. That penalty is a
j;j See Bazelon, The Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 42
U. ON. L. REV. 1 (1973); Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized
Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice, 42 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 227 (1973).
j4 See Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV. 685,
711 (1968); DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 63, at 40.
j5See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 41-42 (1972) (Burger, C.J. concurring);
Junker, supra note 74, at 709.
j6 "Frequently, it is physically impossible for the deputy city attorney to know any-
thing about the details of the charge, the background of the defendant, or his record."
Nutter, The Quality of Justice in Misdemeanor Arraignment Courts, 53 J. CRIM. L.C.
& P.S. 215 (1962).
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rough gauge of the strength of legislative disapproval of the underlying
conduct and a gross predictor of the social stigma likely to attach to
a conviction.7i Arguably, an offense for which any jail penalty is au-
thorized ought to be considered significant, since jail is an inherently
degrading sanction, however short its duration. 78 If the legislature has
seen fit to authorize such degradation, the offense is unlikely to be
wholly free of stigma or collateral consequences to the defendant over
the course of his lifetime, even if he escapes a jail sentence.
In many states, of course, this would result in virtually all offenses
being judged significant. Legislatures, however, are free to withdraw
their authorization of jail sentences wherever they don't mean it,79 They
ought to be forced to make a determination-is the cost of appointed
counsel worth maintaining the authorized jail penalty? Unless there is
strong disapproval of the conduct, unless a jail sentence is a sincere
rather than ornamental sanction, the answer ought clearly to be no.
If it is yes, counsel should be required.
Even if a court is unwilling to require counsel whenever jail is au-
thorized, it should take the authorization and its length into account
with other factors. Moreover, it should determine the likelihood of jail
sentences, by class of offense, and determine significance by discounting
the average jail term by its statistical likelihood.80
A related factor is pre-trial detention. If an offense is of sufficient
importance to warrant pre-trial arrest or detention as a common prac-
tice, then it is an offense warranting counsel. A loss of liberty is no less
a substantial deprivation before conviction than afterward. Arrest and
pre-trial detention will ordinarily have only two functions: assuring the
defendant's appearance at trial or punishment in advance of or in lieu
of conviction. If the function is the former, it reflects a judgment that
the offense is significant, if not serious. If the latter, subversion of the
. right to counsel would be permitted if counsel were denied because
the accused had in effect served his sentence before conviction.
It seems, therefore, that absent all other indicia of significance, if
the accused was arrested for the charge or it is customary to arrest
for the charge, the offense is a significant one.
77 See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
78 UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 15(b) (Tent. Draft No.2, 1973)
(entitling defendant to appointed counsel if "charged with an offense punishable by
incarceration." Several states are in accord, e.g., Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 113-3 (Smith-Hurd», Massachusetts (MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. RULE 3:10), New
Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 604-A: 1-2 (Supp. 1973», and Texas (TEX.
CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 26.04 (1966».
79 For a helpful description of a legislative reaction to A rgersinger, by the Virginia
Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General, see Miller and Lefcoe, Gideon's
Encore, the Argersinger Decision in Virginia, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 431, 453 (1973).
80 See note 74 supra: cf. James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 1969).
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If there is no pre-trial detention and no authorized jail sentence, i.e.
if the only possible penalty is a fine, the amount of the maximum au-
thorized fine is a similar gauge of the significance of the offense. Deter-
mining how high an authorized fine must be to suggest stigma seems
inherently arbitrary, but surely the~e is a figure which clearly removes
an offense from the de minimus category. 81
Virtually the only direct sanctions for misdemeanor convictions in
this country are jail, fines, or a combination of the two. Statutes typi-
cally provide, moreover, that a defendant who fails to pay a fine shall
be imprisoned until the fine is paid.82 There is usually a rate of credit
of so much per day, thus placing a limitation on the length of imprison-
ment. Some jurisdictions add further outside limits, e.g. 90 days in
Michigan,83 eleven months in Maine,84 two years in Mississippi.85 What
bearing do these "work-off" provisions have in determining the right to
counsel? Some pre-Argersinger cases held that in calculating the maxi-
mum authorized jail sentence, from which "seriousness" would be in-
ferred, the total possible jail time should include any jail time which
could be served if the accused failed to pay the fine. 86 Thus, if the
applicable statute authorizes a fine up to $100 and 90 days in jail and
provides for the "work-off" of fines at the rate of $2 per day, the total
authorized jail term would be 50 plus 90 or 140 days.
If this approach is combined with that earlier suggested-that any
authorized jail term should result in the right to counsel, then even an
offense for which a fine was the only permissible direct sanction would
be a significant one and the right to appointed counsel would attach to
every case in a jurisdiction retaining work off-procedures. This arguably
goes too farY It is reasonably clear after Tate v. Short,88 that only one
having the means to pay a fine can be jailed. It seems odd to suggest
81 Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910, 916 (Alas. 1971) (finding a right
to counsel in any misdemeanor case where "the penalty on conviction . . . may result
in incarceration . . . loss of a valuable license, or a fine so heavy as to indicate crimi-
nality."); 18 U.S.c. § 1 (1970) (classifying as non-petty offenses misdemeanor the
penalty for which does not exceed six months or a $500 fine); N. H. REV. STAT. §§
604-A: 1-2 (Supp. 1973) (entitling defendant to counsel for a misdemeanor providing
for imprisonment or a fine exceeding $500) (emphasis added). See also United States
v. R. L. Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1971); Mayer v. City of Chicago, supra
note 68.
82 See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 246-59 (1970) (Appendix).
83 MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.4815 (1968).
84 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1904 (Supp. 1970).
85 MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-1-1 (1972).
86 Matthews V. Florida, 422 E2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1970); James V. Headley, 410
F.2d 325, 326 (5th Cir. 1969).
87 Ct. note 106 infra.
88401 U.S. 395 (1971).
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that a court, determining the right of an indigent to appointed counsel,
should take into account a penalty provision applicable in the main only
to nonindigents. Yet the authorized jail term is still an index of the
seriousness of the offense. Whether the jail term is authorized as a
direct sanction or in lieu of fine payment, it still embodies the legislative
judgment that the offense merits a sometimes lengthy jail term. If such
.is not the legislative intent, the "work-off" provisions can be repealed
or confined to significant offenses.
Misdemeanor convictions frequently constitute occupational disabili-
ties. They may even be a legal bar to occupational licenses. 89 If so, the
offense should probably be judged significant, regardless of the direct
penalty authorized by statute.
Convictions also often have other collateral consequences of varying
directness. They may reflect on "good character" or other vague licens-
ing criteria.9o Here, the appropriate inquiry would seem to require con-
sulting the case law and applicable regulations, if any, to determine
whether conviction of the particular offense can be considered as dero-
gating from "good character." If so, then the offense should be classified
as significant, even if there is no present expectation that the defendant
will seek such a license. He ought to be free to do so, unless given the
right to counsel.
Misdemeanor convictions may also warrant revocation of probation or
parole. Surely, any conviction which could be considered a ground for
revocation is significant,91 even for a defendant who is neither a proba-
tioner nor a parolee. An offense which would suffice to make a law
breaker out of a parolee is significant for anyone convicted of it.
Other convictions, although carrying little stigma and having no
possible effect on occupational licensing, may have severe consequences
nonetheless. Speeding or reckless driving may result in virtually auto-
matic loss of driver's licenses. In many states, moreover, speeding and
other traffic offenses are on a "point system" under which a driver, after
89 See generally Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 n. II (1972) (Powell, 1.,
concurring); Bromberger, Rehabilitation and Occupational Licensing: A Conflict of
Interests, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 794 (1972); Project, The Collateral -Consequences
of A Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929 (1970). In New York, a person
convicted of any offense may be denied a license as a bail bondsman, a barber, or a
hairdresser. Brief for Appelant at Appendix C-2, C-3, Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66 (1970).
90 In New YorkJ one must be of "good character" to be a pawnbroker, a hair-
dresser, a barber, a photographer, a junk dealer, or a street musician; to operate a
motion picture theatre, a pool hall, a newsstand, a laundry, a garbage removal service,
among others. Brief for Appellant at Appendix C-5, Baldwin v. New York, supra
note 89.
91 See Sweeton v. Sneddon, 324 F. Supp. 1094 (D. Utah 1971).
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accumulating a specified number of "points" during a fixed time period
may have his license revoked or suspended.92 Moving vehicle offenses
also characteristically result in higher insurance rates or even uninsur-
ability. Given the substantial adverse consequences of such schemes,
many such offenses can hardly fail a test of significance.93
Other offenses may fail all the foregoing tests of significance, yet be
such because they are occupationally related. Selling merchandise with-
out a license, for example, may be morally neutral and carry a minor
monetary penalty,94 but a valid conviction may destroy a defendant's
business or occupation if the license is unobtainable, and the conviction
may make it SO.95
Finally, offenses may have little or none of the consequences de-
scribed above, yet carry stigma. Minor sex offenses and drunkenness fit
this category.96
In considering all these possible consequences, the judge will be
guided, of course, by his experience. If he is unwilling to consider a
legally authorized consequence enough in itself to warrant the offense's
characterization as significant, he may discount the severity of any con-
ceivable but uncertain disadvantage flowing from the conviction by its
improbability. Having done so, his job is finished if he finds in favor of
the right to counsel. If he doesn't, he must move on to the next inquiry,
whether the charge threatens a "deprivation in fact."
C. Deprivations in Fact
If the significance of offense test is intelligently and generously ap-
plied, there will rarely be a need to examine the particular circumstance
of the case. Argersinger makes clear, however, that if the judge is un-
willing to classify the offense as significant, he must be sensitive to the
special circumstances. Not only is he preclUded from imposing a jail
sentence on an uncounse1ed accused, he is disabled from imposing any
equivalent sanction.
92 7 AM. JUR. 2d Automobile and Highway Traffic § 112 (1963).
93 See Capler v. City of Greenville, 422 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1970); Mills v. Munic-
ipal Court for San Diego Jud. Dist., 10 Cal.3d 383, 515 P.2d 273, 110 Cal. Reptr.
329 (1973). The Court in Argersinger acknowledged that traffic charges "technically
fall within the category of 'criminal prosecutions'," and suggested they could be
removed from the court system. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 38 n.9 (1972).
94 See People v. Markowitz, 18 N.Y.2d 953, 253 N.E.2d 572, 277 N.Y.S.2d 149
(1966) ($6 fine).
95 See note 89 supra.
96 See Beck v. Winters, 407 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963
(1969) (conviction for "immorality"); In re Birch, 10 Ca1.3d 314, 515 P.2d 12, 110
Cal. Rptr. 212 (1973) (urinating in parking lot).
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The conviction, apart from the sanction, may appear de minimus
and non-stigmatizing, yet peculiar circumstances may make it otherwise.
The defendant's driver's license may be jeopardized by a traffic charge
because of his prior driving record. 07 His job may be lost if he is con-
victed, because of its peculiar sensitivity, or because his employer has
indicated as much. There may be an abnormal stigma attached to the
offense in the defendant's community or place of work, which does not
ordinarily adhere to such offenses.
It is difficult to see how a judge can structure a routine inquiry to
flush these matters out. And it is unlikely that the uncounseled accused
will both be aware of such special circumstances and knowledgeable
enough about their relevance to the right to counsel to call them to the
court's attention. Still, in that rare case where, by all objective criteria,
the offense itself is not significant, and such factors appear, the judge
should certainly appoint counsel.98
D. Second Stage Inquiries: Post Conviction Deprivations
The significance of offense tests may not result in a determination of
the right to counsel and the sentence imposed upon conviction may be
a de minimus one. Conviction without counsel may therefore be pre-
sumptively valid. Subsequently, however, the conviction may be relied
upon to impeach the accused as a witness in a trial, to deny a license,
to revoke probation or parole, to enhance a sentence on a later convic-
tion, or to impose a jail sentence for non-payment of a fine originally
imposed upon conviction. The conviction ought to be open to challenge
whenever and wherever the legal system seeks to rely on it as a justifica-
tion for imposing a significant deprivation on the defendant who was
denied counsel. This is to be the prevailing approach with respect to
felony convictions where counsel was denied;99 it seems equally sensible
with respect to misdemeanors.1oo
97 See text accompanying note 92-93 supra.
98 Cf. Sweeton v. Sneddon, 324 F. Supp. 1094 (D. Utah 1971) (counse! required
where misdemeanor conviction could cause parole revocation).
99 See Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443
(1972); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
100 C/. Clay v. Wainwright, 470 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1972); Comment, Will the
Trumpet of Gideon Be Heard in All the Halls 0/ Justice?, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 450,
474 (1971). But see Cottle v. Wainwright, 477 F.2d 269, 275 (5th Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 414 U.S. 895 (1973), holding that an uncounseled misdemeanor con-
viction which resulted in imprisonment could not be used in parole revocation, but
such a conviction which resulted only in a suspended sentence could be, the theory
apparently being that a conviction is valid for all purposes if not followed directly by
a prison sentence. For an even more niggardly interpretation of' Argersinger, see
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Minor court magistrates and judges will be understaffed, undertrained,
and overworked for the foreseeable future. Many are therefore hostile
to expansive rights to counsel. Not only does the warning and inquiry
take valuabJe time, actual appointment of counsel results in delays and
time-consumption. The counsel-appointing process will almost certainly
be a drain on the resources of any court administering misdemeanors.
There is less reason, therefore, to presume validity of a trial judge's
denial of counselor determination of waiver in a misdemeanor case
than such a determination in a court of general jurisdiction administer-
ing felony cases. Not only is the pressure to disregard the defendant's
interests stronger in the misdemeanor case, there is far less reason for
a judge to anticipate that his decision will be reviewed. One convicted
of a felony without counsel will often be motivated, after the conviction,
to seek counsel and appeal his conviction, causing the denial of counsel
to be reviewed before another court. This is less likely for a misde-
meanant who is not sent to jail for a long time.
Erroneous denials of the right to counsel will almost certainly be
routine during the foreseeable future. The first occasion for the error
to come to a court's attention may be long after the conviction, in
collateral proceedings. There is no cogent reason for precluding an
attack at this stage. Not only is this approach consistent with the prin-
ciple that no significant deprivation can be imposed on an accused who
has been denied counsel, but the opportunity to challenge the original
conviction is also essential if abuses in the original process are to come
to light. 101
Under this approach, an indigent who is denied counsel can be con-
victed of an insignificant offense, but the conviction will have only
presumptive or provisional validity; it cannot be the predicate at any
time for a significant deprivation by the legal process. A probationer or
parolee should be permitted to challenge the conviction in his revoca-
tion proceedings, for example, and, if counsel was denied, the conviction
should be a nullity.
This also means that magistrates cannot avoid Argersinger by impos-
ing a suspended sentence or probation upon an uncounseled defendant,
then revoking it later. Even if counsel is appointed for the revocation
proceeding,I02 the original conviction should be disregarded. The Court
Hensley v. Ranson, 373 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. Va. 1974), holding that a driver's license
can be revoked in reliance upon an uncounseled traffic offense which resulted in
incarceration.
101 See S. BING & S. ROSENFELD, THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE IN THE LOWER CRIMINAL
COURTS OF METROPOLITAN BOSTON 24-28 (1970) [hereinafter cited as QUALITY OF
JUSTICE].
102 Ct. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128
(1967).
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held in Argersinger that no person can be "imprisoned for any offense
... unless he was represented by counsel at his trial."103 It would be
sheer formalism to hold that this may be done provided it occurs in
two or more stages.
Fines are more troublesome. If jail or suspended sentences cannot be
imposed upon an indigent without counsel, can he be fined, then jailed
for nonpayment of the fine? It is reasonably clear that one who receives
a perfectly valid fine, predicated upon a conviction obtained with all
due process, may not be jailed for failure to pay the fine if he has no
means to pay.104 This would be a fortiori true of an indigent who was
denied counsel and was unable to pay the fine. But what of a misdemean-
ant who was financially unable to employ counsel but able to pay a small
fine? Suppose he is denied counsel, fined $20, then willfully refuses to
pay? Would it be consistent with Argersinger to send him to jail? If, as
in many states, a fine is automatically converted to a jail sentence upon
nonpayment, or the sentence is expressly in the alternative,105 the
answer should clearly be in the negative. l06 But if there is a hearing,
with right of counsel, and proof that the failure to pay was willful, the
answer is not so easy. The proceeding is then analogous to a contempt
proceeding for failure to obey a court order to pay a debt. If the fine
is "valid," why cannot jail be employed as a collection device? To hold
that it may not is to deprive the states of their customary means of
enforcing fines and comes close to claiming that no sanctions whatever
can be enforced against an indigent accused while denying him counsel.
Yet I think that is where we must come out, for whatever label is given
it, the jailing of the accused rests upon his conviction, and the conviction
cannot constitutionally bear such weight. The defendant would still be
"imprisoned for [the] offense"107 and the Court has said this cannot be
done if the accused was denied counsel at his trial. lOS
This doesn't necessarily preclude the levying of fines upon indigents
who are denied counsel, but it does mean that no such fines can be
103 407 U.S. at 37.
104 Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
105 See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 246-59 (1970) (Appendix).
106 State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967). The Commonwealth of
Virginia argued in Argersinger that an imprisonment-in-fact standard would invalidate
jail-for-nonpayment statutes unless counsel was appointed in fine-only cases and that
this would make it impossible to impose any sanctions. Brief of Commonwealth of
Virginia as Amicus Curiae at 3, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). The
Court avoided this issue, failing even to note that Argersinger himself was sentenced
to jail only on the condition that he failed to pay a $500 fine. See note 11 supra.
107 407 U.S. at 37.
los/d.
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enforced by imprisonment, whether the judgment is labelled a "sentence"
or a "contempt sanction. "109
IV. WAIVER
"Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be repre-
sented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability
to assert any other rights he may have."lIo Accordingly, an effective
waiver of counsel requires a record showing that the defendant under-
stands
the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included
within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder,
possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitiga-
tion thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad under-
standing of the whole matter. l11
Before there can be a waiver, the accused must be expressly offered
counsel and his rejection of the offer must be intelligent and under-
standing. "Anything less is not waiver."112
The Second Circuit has declared that the trial judge must not only
explain in detail the defendant's rights, he must tell the accused "that
it is advisable to have a lawyer, because of his special skill and training
in the law, and that the judge believes it is in the best interest of the
defendant to have a lawyer ...."113 This advice must be coupled with
a clear statement to the accused that "if he has no means to retain a
lawyer of his own choice, the judge will assign a lawyer to defend him,
without expense or obligation to him."114
If the accused persists in his waiver efforts, the judge must conduct
an "inquiry bearing upon the defendant's capacity to make an intelligent
choice. "115 The accused must not only understand the broad factual and
legal aspects of the case, he must possess the "mental condition, age,
109 A state may seek to recover fines by ordinary collection mechanisms and may
permit payment in installments. See Ex Parte Scott, 471 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. Ct. Crim.
App. 1971).
110 Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1956).
111 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948). For a slightly different formu-
lation, see ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 6.6 (1972) [hereinafter cited as TRIAL JUDGE].
112 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962). A deficient waiver invalidates the
conviction without any showing of prejudice. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468
(1938); Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1961).
113 United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964).
114 /d.
IHi Id.
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education, experience" to warrant an inference that his waiver is know-
ing, voluntary, and intelligent. llG
A fair application of these criteria will rarely result in a waiver in a
felony case, since efforts at waiver will almost always be based upon
false premises or ignorance. l17 It has even been held, for example, that
an attorney of nearly thirty years' experience, claiming reasonable fa-
miliarity with the criminal law, was incompetent to waive counsel and
represent himself in a relatively simple prosecution for failure to file
income tax returns. 118 It has also been cogently suggested that no one
should be found capable of making an intelligent waiver unless he first
consults a lawyer. 119
These standards have no kinship with the counsel-appointing prac-
tices in most minor criminal courts.120 In a study of criminal court
practices in Metropolitan Boston, defendants arraigned before courts
having general jurisdiction to try misdemeanors were rarely told of
their right, if indigent, to have court appointed counsel,121 even though
state law guaranteed the right to virtually all misdemeanants.122
In one case, the colloquy consisted of a single question by the judge,
"Do you have any money?" and an answer, "Yes."123 Another defendant
was asked how much money he had in his pocket. He replied, "forty
cents." The judge, presumably in jest, told the defendant he "should
hire a forty-cent lawyer." Missing the joke, the Spanish-speaking ac-
cused was tried and convicted without a lawyer.124
In another encounter, an accused who loudly asserted his innocence
was told to behave himself or the court would find he could afford his
own lawyer. 125 One judge, in the teeth of the law, categorically refused
to appoint counsel in minor traffic and drunkeness cases.126
Judges were commonly observed to bargain with the accused, imply-
ingly promising a lenient sentence if counsel was waived. Defendants
116 See Townes v. United States, 371 F.2d 930, 934 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 387
U.S. 947 (1966); DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 63.
117 See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466-69 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); TRIAL JUDGE, supra note 111, at § 6.6, Commentary.
118 United States v. Harrison, 451 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1971).
119 DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 63, at § 7.3.
120 For a dated but comprehensive study, see Silverstein, supra note 34, at 89-102.
121 Few judges make an "effort to explain that a lawyer will be assigned free of
charge if the defendant [is] indigent." QUALITY OF JUSTICE, supra note 101, at 51.
122 Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3: 10 provides for the right to appointed counsel for all
offenses "for which a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed."
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were assured their rights would be protected without a lawyer or that
they would be "satisfied" with the results if they proceeded pro se.127
The Boston judges apparently kept their word, for persons without
lawyers were acquitted in 37 percent of the cases compared to an acquit-
tal rate of 17 percent for those with assigned counseP28 Of those con-
victed, defendants without lawyers went to jail in only 12 percent of
the cases; those with assigned counsel were jailed in 35 percent. Twenty-
six percent of unrepresented defendants received a fine only, compared
with only ten percent who had assigned counsel.129
In a post-Argersinger study of the Municipal Court of Toledo,130 the
practices of three judges presiding over a court with misdemeanor but
non-traffic jurisdiction were observed. The first observation was a week
after the Argersinger decision. The second was six months later. In the
first observation, one judge said nothing about the right of appointed
counsel and the question of waiver did not arise. Twenty-two of 29
defendants appeared without counsel. Seven of the 22 were sentenced to
jail.131
Another judge sent 44 of 271 unrepresented defendants to jail. None
had been asked if he wanted a lawyer.132
Six months after Argersinger, the two judges observed did at least
mention the right to appointed counsel. One, however, gave only a
group instruction at the opening of court.133 When individually called
before the bench, none of the defendants were asked by this judge whether
he wanted or could afford an attorney. The failure to request an attorney
was considered a waiver. 134 Of the 84 persons unrepresented, 14 were
sentenced to jail.135
The other judge gave group instructions about the right to counsel,
then asked each defendant, as his case was called, if he wanted counsel
appointed.136 If the accused said no, the judge would tell him that there
was an attorney from the Bar Association who would be appointed if
the defendant desired. If the accused said he did not want the lawyer,
the judge declared a waiver. Under this procedure, 38 percent of un-
127/d. at 53.
128 /d. at 54.
129/d.
130 Comment, The Effect of Argersinger v. Hamlin on The Municipal Court of
Toledo, Ohio, 4 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 577 (1973) [hereinafter cited as TOLEDO].
131 /d. at 579.
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represented defendants requested counsel,l3i as compared to eight per-
cent before another judgel3S and about three percent before a third, who
gave only a group instruction. 139
Unlike Boston, there was apparently no bargaining in Toledo between
judge and accused over the right to counsel. There was almost no occa-
sion for bargaining before two of the three judges observed since failure
to request counsel after a group instruction was considered a waiver by
default. The third judge seemed to make a conscientious effort to follow
the law, but even he failed to conduct an examination which would
support a finding that waiver was informed or intelligent under prevail-
ing standards.
It is unconstitutional to sentence an accused more severely because
he requests appointment of counsel.140 Yet this was the effect of prac-
tices in Boston. To a judge who is harried by the counsel-appointing
process or wishes to compensate for what he knows are procedural
inadequacies in waiver-determination, such rewards for "waiver" have
a strong attraction.
The surest solution for the inadequacies in the appointment process
is the same as that for most of the graver ills of the criminal process:
decriminalization,141 more courts, and more personnel. The Supreme
Court may be right in thinking that there are plenty of lawyers in the
profession to service needy misdemeanants,142 but they will be there only
if fairly compensated or conscripted. And to the extent that the appoint-
ment or appearance of counsel slows or complicates the process, imple-
137/d. at 586-87.
13s/d. at 584.
139/d. at 593. In a post-Argersinger study in New Mexico, of 2,000 defendants in
magistrate's courts, only two had court-appointed counsel. Apparently, no mention
was made at arraignment of the right to counsel and a few defendants who were
interviewed after conviction indicated that they had not been aware of a right to
appointed counsel. S. BLAKE & G. FARRAH, THE IMPACT OF THE Argersinger DECISION:
PROVIDING COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT MISDEMEANANTS 5, 7 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
BLAKE & FARRAH]. A survey of prosecutors in 280 counties in all fifty states suggests
Argersinger has had little impact on the misdemeanor criminal process. Ingraham,
The Impact of Argersinger-One Year Later, 8 LAW & SOC. REV. 615 (1974).
140 Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). But see Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). .
HI See generally TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 65, at 97-107; PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 249 (1968); Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminal-
ization, 374 ANNALS 157 (1967). The Court in Argersinger explicitly suggested, as a
"partial solution," the decriminalization of victimless conduct (e.g. public drunken-
ness, narcotics addiction, vagrancy, and deviant sexual behavior) and other "non-
serious offenses, such as housing code and traffic violations." 407 U.S. at 38 n.9.
142 407 U.S. at 37 n.7. See generally La France, Criminal Defense Systems for the
Poor, 50 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 41, 100-01 (1974) [hereinafter cited as La France].
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mentation of Argersinger places burdens on all court personnel and
physical facilities as well. 143 These must be met by appropriations.
Some interim measures and efficiencies may nonetheless be feasible.
It is hard to see, for example, why a court clerk or a law student can't
be employed to pass out instruction forms and give individual explana-
tions of rights to defendants. And in major urban areas, a public de-
fender, or several, can be on hand to consult with defendants prior to
their arraignment, without being first appointed. 144 These procedures
should improve the process of informing defendants of their rights and
could, if coupled with a group instruction from the judge, suffice to
educate the accused in a general way about his right to counsel prior
to arraignment. The judge's role in determining waiver could then be-
come less an educational process and more of a testing and probing one.
He could engage in a meaningful dialogue with the accused which
would minimize rote repetition of rituals and focus on individual under-
standing.
The Supreme Court has not passed upon the legitimacy of less formal,
flexible approaches to waiver in misdemeanor cases. It is an open ques-
tion, therefore, whether precisely the same record showing is required
for relatively non-serious misdemeanor cases as for felonies. If the right
is the same, does it follow that the identical presumption against waiver
holds in less serious cases? The California Supreme Court has said no.
In In re Johnson,145 the court held that while a waiver of counsel in a
misdemeanor case must affirmatively appear on the record, this may be
achieved in ways short of the elaborate inquiry required in felony cases.
Questionnaires and forms filled out in advance of arraignment can
serve the educational purpose and facilitate determination of the intelli-
gence of waiver.146
The sheer volume of cases disposed of in misdemeanor courts may
arguably warrant some streamlining, even where constitutional rights
are concerned. Beyond that, the fact that the stakes are usually smaller
in misdemeanor than felony cases may justify some relaxation of the
143 In many minor courts, it is apparently not uncommon for the prosecution to be
presented by a policeman, or the judge himself, rather than a prosecutor. See Arger-
singer v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 49 (Powell, J., concurring); BLAKE & FARRAH, supra
note 139, at 4; QUALITY OF JUSTICE, supra note 101, at 22-23.
144 La France, supra note 142, at 77.
145 62 Cal.2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1965). See also Mills v.
Municipal Court of San Diego, 10 Cal.3d 288, 515 P.2d 273, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1973) .
146See Mills v. Municipal Court of San Diego, 10 Ca1.3d 288, 312, 515 P.2d 273,
290, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329, 346 (1973).
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no-waiver presumption. As the probable consequences to an accused
diminish, his willingness to spend his time in court and conferring with
a lawyer will also tend to diminish. As the right to counsel is broadened,
therefore, it makes more sense for a court to consider the possibility
that a fully informed accused will wish to waive counsel. An accused
felon who tries to waive his right to appointed counsel is at best a fool;
one charged with failure to stop at a traffic light who says he wants to
waive may just still be in a hurry.
No !Jrocedure should survive, however, which does not permit a rea-
sonable inference of informed, intelligent waiver. In considering whether
a mechanism meets that test, the gravity of the offense the potential
and probable direct and collateral consequences of a conviction should
be considered. At a minimum, in any case in which the right to counsel
exists, the accused should be made to understand that if he is indigent,
a lawyer will be appointed without cost and without penalty of any
kind; indigency should be clearly and liberally defined, and the accused
should individually be asked if he wants a lawyer appointed. If he says
no, and he meets the indigency tests, he should be asked if he has con-
sulted a lawyer. If he replies in the negative, he should be directed to
consult public counsel, if available in the courtroom, before making a
final decision. If no such counsel is available, the court should engage
him in a colloquy the length, specificity, and nature of which should
vary with the charge, the probable range of penalties, such facts as are
known to the judge, and the apparent intelligence and sophistication
of the accused. If the defendant has filled out a waiver form, the judge
should question him about it to ascertain he fully understands it.
The right to appointed counsel is meaningless if the accused fails to
exercise it through ignorance, misunderstanding, or fear.
V. INDIGENCE
The right of poor persons to be represented by counsel is a four-
legged throne which will collapse unless all legs are strong and of equal
length. The two legs previously discussed, the right itself and presump-
tions against waiver, have no function without the other two, the mean-
ing of "indigency" and the procedures for determining its existence.
As the right to counsel is strengthened and waiver doctrine implemented,
courts must concentrate on the rest of the support to get and keep the
throne erect. Thus far, the Supreme Court has never dealt with the defi-
nition of indigency nor seriously evaluated determination procedures.147
147 But see James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Wood v. United States, 389 U.S.
20 (1967).
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A. The Concept
The values which guide the giving of meaning to questions of "in-
digency" are similar to those with which we determine the rates by
which we graduate income tax, the minimum wage, and social security
benefits. They are decisions about the sharing of affluence.
Special considerations, however, support provisions to assure that the
accused in a criminal case is equipped with the means of contest. First
is the question of innocence. It is an outrage that an innocent accused
should be made to pay any part of the cost of his own defense, yet there
is no mechanism by which a defendant, declared innocent, can recoup
his loss. Since we know that a substantial fraction of defendants in
criminal cases are factually and legally innocent, we magnify the out-
rage in proportion to our insistence that accused persons pay for their
own defense. Apart from unfairness to persons ultimately found inno-
cent, moreover, we ignore our ideal of presumed innocence whenever
we require an accused in advance of trial to bear any costs connected
with the process. If we were serious about this ,ideal, we would offer
free defense counsel to every criminal accused. Furthermore, defense
counsel performs an essential role in the adversary process. His role,
no less than that of the judge, the jury, and the prosecutor, serves the
public interest and permits the system to function. One would be thought
deranged who suggested that an accused pay not only for a defense
lawyer but a portion of the salaries of the prosecutor, the judge, and
jury. The state pays for these participants for the same reason it supplies
the courtroom: the criminal process is quintessentially a public func-
tion. Yet the defense lawyer performs a public function no less than
they when he participates in the process. It is far from clear that a
principled distinction can be drawn between the defense lawyer and the
other functionaries in the process-why the state should pay for some
of them but not all. This should make us uneasy about imposing costs
on any criminal accused; it should preclude us from doing so against
those in our society least able to afford it.
The criminal process, among other things, is a mechanism for dispute
settlement. It seeks to displace, in large measure, private remedies and
revenge on the part of persons who feel abused by others. It likewise
restricts, by a maze of sanctions (e.g. those against extortion, obstruc-
tion of justice, intimidation of witnesses, bribery, subornation of per-
jury), the avenues of relief otherwise open to a person accused of
wrongdoing. Disputes between private persons, therefore, when they
fall into the realm of criminal law, are funnelled into a process which
substantially monopolizes modes of resolution. Having drawn a circle
around the dispute, the system cannot rationally take sides but must
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provide all participants with a fair opportunity to present their case.
No such opportunity exists for a defendant if he is made to pay a price
for participation that dwarfs in significance the stakes of the dispute.
Thus, fairness requires that the costs of his participation be kept below
the values at issue, since there is otherwise no meaningful opportunity
to be heard.148
The imposition of costs or disadvantages as a condition of the exer-
cise of Constitutional rights may also be an infringement of the Consti-
tutional rights involved. 149 The exercise of the right may be "needlessly
chilled" if the state's pecuniary interests are treated as paramount to
the Constitutional rights of the accused. A state's interest in saving itself
the modest cost of a defense lawyer to represent a person whom the
state has elected to prosecute for· crime must be inferior to the Consti-
tutional rights of any accused who is deterred by the cost of defense
counsel from participating meaningfully in the contest. 150 Monetary
barriers must not deprive an accused of freedom of choice. He has no
such freedom if the cost of the contest, though within his grasp, is too
dear. So long as waiver is regarded as legitimate, the Constitution does
not prevent an accused from foregoing a contest, but the system must
be so structured as to assure that the cost of a mainstay of the system-
defense counsel-not be the overriding consideration in his decision to
surrender. 151
When an accused is charged with a felony, the mere request for ap-
pointed counsel is a strong indication of indigency. The stakes are so
high, most defendants would not forego the retention of counsel if it
were reasonably within their means.152 The request itself becomes a less
reliable indicator of indigence, however, as the seriousness of the charge
diminishes. An accused could feel he has nothing substantial to gain
or lose by counsel and might request counsel simply because it is offered.
It is therefore imperative that lower court judges adopt relevant stan-
dards of indigency and follow procedures calculated to permit a rea-
soned judgment of eligibility. The failure to offer counsel, the promise
148C!. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 372 (1971).
149 Ct. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
150 Ct. Strange v. James, 323 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Kansas 1971), aO'd on other
grounds, James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
151 Although equal protection principles have been held to create a right to ap-
pointed counsel on appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the Court has
never employed them in determining the right to trial counsel. Logically applicable,
a fortiori, such principles are unnecessary at the trial level; due process can do the job.
See Kamisar and Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings
and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1963). See generally note 68 supra.
152 D. Oaks, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 111-36
( 1967) [hereinafter cited as OAKS].
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of leniency if counsel is waived, the implicit threat of a more severe
sentence if counsel is claimed, or pre-trial detention coupled with delay
for those requesting counsel, are subversions rather than substitutes.
A criterion of indigency which focuses merely on the defendant's
access to assets or his income is inadequate. Rather, the test should be
whether the cost of the defense, considering all aspects of defendant's
financial condition, would impose a substantial hardship on the accused
or his family.153 A sum of money which is a "substantial hardship" will
vary geographically and with the prevailing costs and standards of liv-
ing, since the objective is to prevent an accused from foregoing a con-
test for none other than economic reasons. 154
Rigid eligibility standards based solely on income, with adjustments
for dependents, which are in force in many jurisdictions, are off target.
They bear little relationship to substantial hardship.
The fact that an accused is able to make bail, often used as a bench-
mark for denying counsel,155 is virtually irrelevant. Bail money is not
available for the defense. It may also have been lent by friends or rela-
tives. A defendant's access to funds with which to obtain his pre-trial
release is no guaranty of his ability to pay counsel. The converse is true,
however. One who is unable to purchase his release ought virtually to
be considered eligible for appointed counsel ipso facto. 156
Since indigency is both relative and functional, a decision is inco-
herent if it does not take into account the probable cost of counsel.
This will, of course, differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and will vary
with the charge. In determining eligibility, however, the judge should
estimate the probable cost of retaining counsel for a trial of the offense.
To hold that an accused can afford the average cost of representation
for a particular offense is simply to decide he can afford a lawyer to
plead him guilty. This is an impermissible prejudgment of the merits
and a preclusion of the very choice the right to counsel seeks to pre-
serve.157
The judge should add to this figure the cost of obtaining release on
bond, if defendant is in jail, estimated costs of investigative services and
153 DEFENSE SERVlCES, supra note 63, at 53-54. See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 336AA
(1965) ("without prejudicing his financial ability to provide economic necessities for
himself or his family").
154 An accused is indigent when his "lack of means ... substantialIy inhibits or
prevents the proper assertion of a [particular] right or a claim." Attorney General's
Report on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice 9 (1963).
155 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 34, at 107; QUALITY OF JUSTICE, supra note 101, at 52.
156 And eligibility should be determined as part of the booking process, subject to
review by the court. La France, supra note 142, at 78.
157 See OAKS, supra note 152, at 111-90.
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witness fees, if there is some reason to suspect they may be needed.158
He should add the probable cost of a fine upon conviction, if predict-
able. Only if defendant is able to furnish all these funds "without sub-
stantial hardship" should he be found ineligible.159
In assessing financial hardship, the inquiry should include an inven-
tory of assets, liabilities, and current costs of living. If an accused
personally has net assets which considerably exceed the estimated costs
of his defense, the preliminary inference would be against a finding of
financial inability. If, however, it appears that he is unemployed and
virtually unemployable; if, for example, he has no skills or is aged or
infirm, the inference should vanish. Under such circumstances, if his net
assets are insufficient to support him and his family for the indefinite
future, he is functionally indigent.
If the accused is not otherwise indigent but has no access to ready
cash, e.g. if he has no non-necessaries which can quickly be pledged,
he should also be eligible for appointed counsel. It seems doubtful,
moreover, that an accused should be expected to sell a dilapidated
family car or television set before he can be considered financially un-
able to employ counsel. Families on welfare often have both, and con-
sider them necessaries.
Current income is especially relevant in determining financial hard-
ship in a misdemeanor case where there is no serious prospect that the
charge or a conviction will cause loss of employment. But wages cannot
be considered without reference to obligations in computing the current
income available for the defense. An accused who has large medical
bills or many dependents may be strapped even though he earns sub-
stantial wages. There is no reason, for example, why one who earns
$125 per week should be considered ineligible per se. 160
It is wrong to include in the computation of available funds the assets
of friends, siblings, parents, or children in absence of a legal obligation
to support the accused. The court has no basis for assuming that such
funds will be forthcoming nor for imposing an obligation upon such
persons to pay.161
158 !d.
159 Partial eligibility is another refinement often ignored. Oaks, The Criminal Justice
Act in the Federal District Courts-A Summary and Postscript, 7 AM. CRIM. L. Q.
210, 213 (1969).
160 In an analysis of appointments under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.c. §
3006A (1970), the Administrative Office of the United States Courts found that 5%
of the defendants for whom counsel were appointed earned more than $100 per week.
About 3112 % of defendants for whom counsel was appointed in Chicago in 1966
earned more than $125 per week (3 were over $175), and 12 had more than $200 in
cash. OAKS, supra note 152, at 111-12, 13.
161 OAKS, supra note 152, at 111-99; DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 63, at 54.
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Indigency in the context of right to counsel is not a synonym for
"destitute."162 Since it has often been given that meaning, however, it
should probably be removed from the rhetoric of right to council and
replaced with more meaningful concepts.163
B. The Practice
In those courts where the right to counsel is itself seldom articulated
or explained, questions of indigency are evaded by presumptions of
waiver. 164 When an -accused does request counsel, an apparently com-
mon judicial response is not to determine indigency but to continue the
case to permit the defendant to try to employ a lawyer.165 To an accused
who is in jail, the coercion is clear.
A judge in Toledo was observed to determine non-indigency by the
appearance of defendant's clothing.166 Another defendant was denied
counsel because he owned an eight-year old Ford "in bad shape" on
which he owed $42. The judge told him to sell the car.167 Another ac-
cused, although in tattered clothes, was found ineligible because he had
$30.168 Other ineligibles included a man with no money but $25 in
accrued wages, two men traveling across the country with no resources
other than a 1964 Chevrolet, and a defendant with nothing but a 1960
Pontiac for which he couldn't afford license plates.169 Judges in Toledo
equated inability to hire an attorney with destitution or total absence
of assets. 17O So, apparently, do some judges in Boston. l7l
Apparently only a few courts, chiefly in large cities, employ detailed
questionnaires or affidavits of a type which would permit an assessment
of defendant's financial condition.172 Such questionnaires or their equiva-
lent in the form of on-the-record questioning should be required by
due process. l73 Since waiver of the right to counsel and other constitu-
tional rights cannot be presumed but must be established on the record
by detailed inquiry, it is hard to see how a defendant who has asserted
162 See Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277,289 n.7 (1964).
163 See generally Comment, The Definition of /ndigency: A Modern-Day Legal
Jabberwocky, 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 34 (1972).
164 See text accompanying notes 120-39 supra.
165 OAKS, supra note 152, at 111-22; TOLEDO, supra note 130, at 585.





171 QUALITY OF JUSTICE, supra note 101, at 51.
172 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 65, at 153.
173 Cf. Wood v. United States, 389 U.S. 20 (1967); People v. Cole, 97 Ill. App.2d
22,239 N.E.2d 455 (1968).
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the right to counsel can lawfully be denied the right without clearly
establishing his ineligibility on the record. Ineligibility cannot be gleaned
without a comprehensive cataloging of defendant's financial resources
and obligations.174
It seems a waste of judicial time to make routine, detailed inquiries
into financial resources at arraignment. Non-judicial personnel can hand
out questionnaires in advance of arraignment, have them filled out and
pass them up to the judges who need then only make supplementary
inquiries. The goal is that the facts be gotten, not that they be gathered
in the first instance by a judge.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even a Court as inimical to the claims of criminal defendants as the
current Court cannot deny Mr. Justice Black's Gideon dictum that
lawyers are "essential to a fair trial," whether the trial of a misdemeanor
or the trial of a felony. It thus seems all but inevitable that the right to
appointed counsel will ultimately be extended to all criminal prosecu-
tions, however petty.
If Argersinger is read in the context of the jury trial cases which pre-
ceded it, moreover, that decision was a great stride toward full recogni-
tion of the right to appointed counsel. Rather than approving lawyerless
convictions where no imprisonment is imposed, as many have misread
it, Argersinger suggests that no conviction can be obtained while deny-
ing counsel if it involves a significant deprivation, in whatever form or
combination. When lower courts and legislatures finally bring themselves
to understand the decision, Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Gideon will
be substantially implemented, albeit with less than all deliberate speed.
174 See United States v. Cohen, 419 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1969).
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